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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LABOUR ARBITRATION 
IN ONTARIO 
Mark Thompson 
Courts in Ontario hâve been increasingly willing to 
quash grievance arbitration awards. This article analyses 
the services of this conflict between the judiciary and arbit-
rators, the rôle the courts hâve assumed because of the 
compulsory use of arbitration, and the judges' reliance on 
précèdent established British commercial arbitration. Most 
Ontario cases hâve involved one of four issues — évidence 
of intent, procédural violations of grievance clauses, disci-
plinary penalties, and déniai of natural justice. In the first 
three areas especially, the courts hâve favoured narrow inter-
prétations of collective agreements, limiting arbitrators* 
jurisdiction. This problem illustrâtes the difficulty in attempt-
ing to legislate a complex institution like grievance arbitra-
tion based on foreign expérience, Le. the United States. 
For almost thirty years, grievance arbitration has been an increasingly 
important feature of industrial relations in Ontario. Recently, however, 
the légal status of arbitration awards has become less certain than ever 
before. In a number of cases, Ontario courts (with support from the 
Suprême Court of Canada) hâve overturned arbitrators' décisions, estab-
lished broader grounds for challenging them, and thus encouraged new 
suits to quash awards. After one Suprême Court of Canada décision in 
late 1968, a group of prominent arbitrators protested to the Provincial 
Minister of Labour that the judiciary's action had made arbitration more 
rigid than court proceedings, and vainly sought this support for changes 
in the law to eliminate some court-
imposed restrictions on arbitration l. 
Both the apparent involvement 
of the courts in arbitration and the 
évident opposition of many arbi-
trators to this developmentmay force 
THOMPSON, M., Ph.D. (Comell), 
former Assistant Professor of In-
dustrial Relations, Me Master Uni-
versity. 
* The author wishes to thank Prof. H. W. ARTHURS of Osgoode Hall Law 
School, Toronto, and Mr. E. L. STRINGER of Hamilton for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft. They, of course, bear no responsibility for the opinions or errors 
contained in the final version. 
l The Globe and Mail (Toronto), January 10, 1969. 
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labour, management, and arbitrators themselves to re-examine the légal 
bases of grievance arbitration. In such an analysis, it is necessary to ask 
first, which éléments of Ontario labour relations law hâve led the courts 
to overturn awards. Secondly, if the courts retain their présent position 
on arbitration, and the provincial government opposes statutory amend-
ment, an examination of areas of conflict between arbitrators and the 
courts may indicate coming trends in judicial action. This paper will trace 
the development of judicial review of grievance arbitration in Ontario 
in an effort to deal with each of thèse questions. It will then discuss briefly 
the possible relationship between the interprétation of Ontario labour law 
and broader aspects of Canadian industrial relations. 
CONTEXT OF ARBITRATION 
Grievance arbitration was first used extensively in Ontario after the 
enactment of spécial législation during World War II. In 1939, many 
enterprises in the province were not unionized or had been organized only 
a short time. A few industries, including garment manufacturing, railroads, 
and coal mining, had their own arbitration Systems, but available évidence 
indicates thèse were exceptional cases2. Provincial labour laws, though 
comprehensive, had little effect on the parties prior to the implementation 
of emergency fédéral législation during the war. The most important 
fédéral act, Privy Council Order (PC) 1003, governed ail labour-man-
agement relations in the latter years of the war. Incorporating many 
features of the United States National Labor Relations Act, it also 
compelled resort to private arbitration as the last step of ail grievance 
procédures and banned any work stoppages during the life of an agree-
ment between labour and management. When the parties were unable 
to agrée on their own procédures, the fédéral government provided 
facilities for grievance arbitration3. One effect of PC 1003 and other 
wartime législation was the introduction of grievance arbitration into 
many enterprises in Ontario. 
With the end of the war and the expiration of fédéral powers, the 
provincial government continued to favour arbitration. The Ontario 
Labour Relations Act (OLRA) 4, passed in 1948, retained many provi-
sions of PC 1003, including sections to compel grievance arbitration and 
forbidding strikes during the life of an agreement. This provision has 
not been changed substantially, and it now imposes the following terms : 
Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and binding 
settlement by arbitration without stoppage of work, of ail différencies 
2
 C. H. CURTIS, The Development and Enforcement of the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement, Kingston : Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 
1966, pp. 49-50 ; H. D. WOODS, éd., Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settlement in 
Five Canadian Industries, Montréal : The Industrial Relations Centre, McGill Uni-
versity, 1958, pp. 48, 99. 
3 A. W. R. CARROTHERS, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, Toronto : 
Butterworth's, 1965, pp. 53-55. 
4 Revised Statutes of Ontario (R.S.O.) 1960, c. 202. 
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between the parties arising from the interprétation, application, admin-
istration, or alleged violation of the agreement, including any question 
as to whether a matter is arbitrable 5. 
Should the parties fail to include a clause meeting the requirements 
of this section in a collective agreement, the law stipulâtes a clause which 
will apply, providing for a tripartite arbitration board. In ail cases, if the 
parties' nominees to a board are unable to agrée upon a third member, 
the Minister of Labour is empowered to name the chairman 6. 
Support for the arbitral process and a concomitant désire to exclude 
the courts from arbitration are reflected in several provisions of the OLRA. 
Section 34(7), just cited, apparently gives arbitrators full authority to 
décide questions of arbitrability, thus eliminating a potential source of 
litigation. Elsewhere the law makes ail awards binding on the parties 
and gives board chairmen broad powers to gather évidence and administer 
oaths 7. The OLRA specifically excludes labour disputes from législation 
governing commercial arbitration8, which establishes grounds for judicial 
appeals of awards. Another statute protects unions and collective agree-
ments from ail civil suits except those provided for by the OLRA 9. 
In many respects, grievance arbitration appears to be a créature of 
the law. Although labour and management might well hâve adopted the 
institution without any compulsion, the initial stimulus of PC 1003, and 
the requirement of the OLRA appears to hâve caused the courts to 
examine arbitration closely, despite législative efforts to limit the rôle 
of the judiciary10. 
GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Although the OLRA déclares arbitration awards to be « final and 
binding », this provision has not precluded review by the courts. 
A successful challenge to an award occurs when the High Court of Justice 
(a trial court) grants certiorari and quashes it. In gênerai, the plaintiff 
may claim one of three grounds as the basis for certiorari : a defect in 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal, an error in law on the face of the award, 
or a lack of natural justice in the proceedings n . Traditionally, the courts 
hâve held that an arbitrator's error does not always nullify an award. 
5 R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, s. 34(1) . 
6 R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, ss. 34 (2), 34 (4). 
7 R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, s. 34 (7). 
8 R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, s. 34 (10). 
9 The Rights of Labour Act, R.S.O., 1960, c. 354, ss. 3 (2), 3 (4). 
10 For analysis of the rôle of the law in establishing grievance arbitration, 
H. D. WOODS, « Public Policy and Grievance Arbitration in Canada », in Develop-
ments in American and Foreign Arbitration, éd. by Charles M. Rehmus, Washington : 
BNA, 1968, pp. 19-36. 
il A. W. R. CARROTHERS, Labour Arbitration in Canada, Toronto: Butter-
worths, 1961, p. 149; D. C. M. YÀRDLEY, «The Grounds for Certiorari and 
Prohibition », The Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, May 1959, pp. 298-329. 
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But if an arbitrator exceeds his jurisdiction by deciding a question not 
put to him by the parties, or orders a remedy not in his power to grant, 
he has gone beyond the authority given him, and his award is invalid. 
Thus most successful suits to quash arbitration awards in Ontario hâve 
alleged that an arbitration board has exceeded its jurisdiction 12. Lack of 
natural justice may invalidate any proceeding, but is relatively rare in 
labour arbitration cases 13. 
In 1956 the Ontario courts first asserted their right to review 
arbitration awards, in Re International Nickel Company and Rivando14, 
a décision that also introduced the éléments of the law that were to lead 
to the growth in the judiciary's rôle in arbitration. The case arose from 
the dismissal of a worker for unauthorized absence after management had 
refused him unpaid leave to serve a jail sentence. Seeking to quash an 
arbitration award that ordered reinstatement, the company took its case 
to Ontario's highest tribunal, the Court of Appeal. The court ruled that 
it had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, relying on the légal require-
ment of the parties to use arbitration and the power of the courts to 
supervise « statutory tribunals ». 
The Rivando décision emphasized that the OLRA imposed on labour 
and management the légal obligation to bargain and to « make every 
reasonable effort to make a collective agreement » 15. As disputes arising 
from the interprétation of a contract are subject to final settlement only 
by arbitration, the court concluded that the parties had no alternative 
to arbitration of grievances, i.e. neither true collective bargaining with 
the right to strike, nor litigation. Because of this compulsion, the court 
ruled that it was obligated to supervise arbitration boards 1<s. 
12
 A. W. R. CARROTHERS, Labour Arbitration in Canada, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
13 See below, pp. 470-471. 
14 [1956] O.R. 379, 1 D.L.R., 2d 775. 
15 R.S.O., 1960, c. 202, s. 12. 
16 The importance of the élément of compulsion in the law to the Rivando 
décision is emphasized by références to the case in other jurisdictions. In Regina 
v. Arthurs et al., ex parte Port Arthur Shipbuilding Company, [1969] S.C.R. 85, 
(1968) 70 D.L.R. 2d 693, the Suprême Court of Canada accepted the principles of 
Rivando and distinguished Ontario cases from similar suits arising under other 
statutes. The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigations Act and several pro-
vincial laws provide for the settlement of grievances without strikes by « arbitration 
or otherwise* (emphasis added), and the courts hâve interpreted thèse provisions 
to mean that arbitration therefore is not mandatory. Where the use of arbitration 
is not required, the courts generally hâve held that they lack jurisdiction to quash 
awards. Cf, Polymer Corp. v. OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International 
Union, [1962] S.C.R. 338, 33 D.L.R. 2d 124 (sub nom. Imbleau v. Laskin) ; Howe 
Sound Co. v. Mine Workers' Union, [1962] S.C.R. 318, 33 D.L.R. 2d 18 ; Re Atlantic 
Sugar Rafineries Ltd. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International Union, 
(1961) 45 Mar. Prov. 115, 27 D.L.R. 2d 310, (N.B.S.C.) ; Re Ewaschuk Western 
Plywood Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America, (1964) 47 W.W.R. 426, 
44 D.L.R. 2d 700, (Alta, S.C.). 
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When asserting its authority, the Court relied on cases drawn from 
British arbitration, and particularly the law governing « statutory tribu-
nals », bodies other than courts to whom Parliament has given the power 
of imposing obligations. Thèse tribunals generally are administrative 
boards established to décide disputes between private citizens and public 
agencies over such matters as the value of property expropriated by the 
government, and the Court drew an analogy with the compulsory use of 
private arbitration in the OLRA. According to the Court of Appeal, strong 
précèdent exists in British law for judicial supervision of statutory tribunals, 
thus adding a second rationale for reviewing arbitration awards n . 
Hère it should be emphasized that the Court's déclaration of its 
authority to supervise arbitration did not necessarily mean that it would 
intervene extensively in the process. For instance, the Court could hâve 
exercised its authority by supporting the judgment of arbitrators, on the 
grounds that the parties in a dispute who had chosen a particular arbitra-
tion board should be required to accept its décision. In fact, the Ontario 
judiciary did not adopt such a policy of limited supervision, due in large 
measure to the précédents used in Rivando and subséquent cases. Use of 
British commercial law proved to be a major factor in the eventual 
expansion in the scope of judicial review. 
Références to British cases in Rivando were not, of course, unusual 
in Canadian jurisprudence, but the nature of thèse précédents was to be 
important in the subséquent expansion of judicial review of arbitration. 
Lacking a substantial body of Canadian case law on labour arbitration, 
the Court looked to British précèdent. Since grievance arbitration scarcely 
exists in Great Britain 18, however, the British décisions governed com-
mercial arbitration, regulated by a spécial statute 19 comparable to the 
Ontario Arbitrallons Act, from which the OLRA excludes labour arbitra-
tion. The présent British law, based on common law principles, is a 
consolidation of earlier enactments, principally between 1889 and 1934, 
which gave rise to the cases used to interpret the OLRA. Clearly, the 
Court of Appeal saw problems in using British law in Canada and applying 
n Although the Court's logic on this point is évident, British opinion appears 
less certain on the rôle of the courts in statutory arbitration. The most authoritative 
commentary on British arbitration states : 
It is of the essence of statutory arbitration of the normal sort, that the statute 
concerned makes a particular arbitral tribunal the only tribunal having jurisdiction 
over a particular class of dispute. It follows in particular, that the provision of 
the [Arbitration] Act which gives the court power to refuse a stay of concurrent 
légal proceedings, and in certain sorts of arbitration also those giving power to 
allow revocation of the arbitrator's authority and power to remove an arbitrator, 
will in gênerai be found inapplicable to statutory arbitration. 
T.A. Blanco WHITE and Anthony WALTON, Russell on the Law of Arbitration, 
16th édition ; London : Stevens and Sons, 1957, pp. 90-91. 
1 8
 For example, MORRISON and Majorie HANDSAKER, «Arbitration in Great 
Britain», Industrial Relations, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 117-136; Owen 
FAIRWEATHER, «A Comparison of British ând American Grievance Handling», in 
Developments in American and Foreign Arbitration, op. cit., pp. 1-18. 
19 The Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27. 
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précédents set under a dissimilar statute. But neither Rivando nor any 
succeeding Ontario décision examined the characteristics of British com-
mercial arbitration that might distinguish it from labour arbittation in 
Ontario and the possible impact of thèse différences on the law of labour 
relations. A brief discussion of British practice may clarify later develop-
ments in the Ontario law. 
The feature of British arbitration that became most significant for 
Ontario cases is the extensive influence of the law in private proceedings. 
In gênerai, British commercial arbitrators emulate judicial décisions as 
much as possible20. The same rules of évidence bind private arbitrators 
and the courts, unless the parties to arbitration hâve agreed otherwise, 
and errors in the admission of évidence significant to a décision are cause 
for upsetting an award 21. Both the common law and subséquent statutes 
regulate an arbitrator's obligations and establish the grounds for over-
turning arbitration awards22. Moreover, under the Arbitration Act, either 
party in an arbitration, at any stage of the proceedings prior to the award, 
may compel the arbitrator to submit a question of law arising in the case 
to the courts for an opinion (a « stated » or «spécial» case). Or the 
arbitrator may request such a ruling on his own initiative. On the other 
hand, the court has the power, without any application from either party, 
to remit an award for reconsideration by the arbitrator23. Judicial and 
arbitral proceedings may also take place in a single case, the courts 
deciding points of law, and arbitrators the factual éléments of the dispute24. 
The practice of commercial arbitration also encourages reliance on 
the law. Most cases arise from relatively short-lived commercial relation-
ships and contracts covering a limited range of subjects. There is little 
évidence of the protracted bargaining, with offers and concessions on 
many topics, or a « common law » of arbitration awards that mark semi-
permanent labour-management relationships. Thus the bases for décisions 
of commercial arbitrators are more restricted than in North American 
grievance cases. As a conséquence of the law and thèse traditions, British 
commercial arbitration appears more as a branch of the law than a process 
of private decision-making. 
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
After Rivando established the courts' right to overrule arbitration 
boards, the judiciary hesitated to exercise this power, beginning with the 
refusai by the Court of Appeal to quash the award in Rivando. In several 
subséquent cases, the Court examined the agreement under which a 
challenged award was made, and when it thought the contract language 
could « reasonably bear » the interprétation of the arbitration board, the 
20 Ernest J. PARRY, Commercial Arbitrations, London : Pitman and Sons, 
n.d., p. 3. 
21 WHITE and WALTON, op. cit., pp. 168-169. 
22 The Arbitration Act, op. cit., ss. 21-25. 
23 ibid., ss. 21-25. 
24 WHITE and WALTON, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
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award was sustained, even if the Court might hâve made a différent 
reading of the contract25. Having established this principle, however, 
the appellate court heard few cases. Instead the High Court of Justice 
formulated a set of rules to govern certiorari, and thèse rules limited its 
own powers. 
In granting certiorari, the lower court followed the Court of Appeal 
in turning to British arbitration law for standards to use in classifying 
cases. Awards were divided into two catégories : one in which an arbit-
rator ruled on a « spécifie question of law», and a second in which a 
« question of law became material » to an award. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal and the Suprême Court of Canada first accepted this distinction 
in a case arising from a dispute between a contractor and a mining 
company over the construction of a road, a rather typical example of 
a Canadian commercial arbitration case26. In turn, the Canadian courts 
based their décision on a prominent House of Lords case of a similar 
nature, Absalom v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society 27. 
As it was initially applied in Ontario, the Absalom rule severely 
restricted the power of the Courts to quash arbitration awards. The 
common law in both Great Britain and Canada did not permit the 
quashing of an arbitrator's décision on a « spécifie question of law », 
assuming absence of fraud or misconduct. Even when the courts disagreed 
with an award, they avoided intervention, on the grounds that the parties 
had foregone the right to appeal by their use of arbitration. In practice, 
the rule excluded a large percentage of arbitration awards from judicial 
review in the early years of its application 28. 
However, the Ontario courts never defined precisely a « spécifie 
question of law », although it apparently was an interprétation of a 
contract clause where the parties agreed on the facts of a case. In Absalom 
the arbitrator determined what payments were due a contractor, a 
spécifie question of law in the eyes of the court. A similar conclusion 
25 Re Canadian Westinghouse Co. and Draftsmen's Association of Ontario, 
Local 164, [1962] O.R. 17, 30 D.L.R. 2d 673 ; Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers' Union, Local 598 v. The International Nickel Co., [1962] O.R. 1089, 
35 D.L.R. 2d 371 ; see also décisions of the High Court of Justice in : Re Stude-
baker-Packard of Canada and International Union, United Automobile Workers, 
(1957) 47 O.W.N. 584, 11 D.L.R. 2d 540; Regina v. McDonald, ex parte John 
Inglis Co., [1965] 1 O.R. 511, 48 D.L.R. 2d 577; Regina v. Hanrahan, ex parte 
Davidson, 68 C.L.L.C. para. 14,119; Re International Nickel Co. of Canada and 
United Steelworkers of America, 68 C.L.L.C. para. 14,127. 
26 Faubert v. Temagami Mining Co., [1960] S.C.R. 235, (1959) 17 D.L.R. 
2d 246. 
27 (1933) A.C. 592. 
28 Cf. Re Canadian Westinghouse Company and United Electrical Radio and 
Machine Workers of America, Local 504, [1962] O.R. 20, 30 D.L.R. 2d 676; 
Texaco Canada Ltd. v. OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, 
Local 16-599, (1964) 44 D.L.R. 2d 199; National Union of Public Employées, 
Local 814 v. Ottawa Sanitation Services Ltd., (1963) 64 C.L.L.C. para. 15,490. 
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was reached in an Ontario labour dispute over the proper interprétation 
of a holiday pay provision 29. 
A « question of law became material » when an arbitrator's award 
depended on déterminations of both law and fact, and the common law 
permits courts to quash such décisions. Again there was difficulty in 
defining this category of cases. One authority on arbitration explained that 
a question of law became material when a board had to interpret an 
agreement before dealing with the facts presented. If the contract inter-
prétation should be incorrect, an error of law would serve as the basis 
for a décision and thereby establish grounds for quashing an award 30. Yet 
the courts hâve often ruled that questions of law are material in disciplinary 
cases, where arbitrators gêner ally décide the veracity of charges against 
a worker and then apply a contract clause to the facts of the case. 
This distinction was difficult to explain, and it proved to be artificial 
in its application to labour cases31. As Canadian labour arbitrators followed 
usual North American custom and often examined a variety of factors 
in arriving at their décisions, e.g. past practices, precontract negotiations, 
etc., matters of law and fact were inextricably mixed. When the courts 
tried to apply the Absalom rule, they began to find « material questions 
of law » more frequently, an almost inévitable conséquence of the différ-
ences in the two arbitration Systems. By the mid-1960's, the proportion 
of successuful challenges to awards appears to hâve risen sharply. The 
issues before the courts varied, and will be discussed in the second half 
of this paper, but the gênerai resuit of the décisions was a substantial 
érosion of the restriction on judicial action implicit in the courts' original 
assertion of their authority to review arbitration. 
As this trend grew more pronounced, another attack on the validity 
of the Absalom rule was made. The broad assertion of judicial authority 
in Rivando raised a question of the courts' right to reject pétitions for 
certiorari on the gênerai grounds that they answered spécifie questions of 
law. It was this problem of judicial responsibility that caused the Court 
of Appeal in 1968 to dismiss the distinction developed by the lower court. 
Extending the logic of Rivando, the Court in Regina v. Barber expli-
citly rejected the division of arbitration cases based on Absalom 32. The 
décision involved a part-time super-market clerk who claimed certain 
benefits provided in a collective agreement. An arbitration board denied 
the benefits, and when the union appealed the décision to the courts, the 
employer argued that the award was not subject to review because the 
29 Re Sudbury Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers' Union, Local 598 v. International 
Nickel Company of Canada, supra, note 25. 
30 CURTIS, The Development and Enforcement of the Collective Agreement, 
pp. 89-90. 
31 For an example of the problems in using this distinction, see Regina v. 
Bigelow, ex parte Sefton (1965) 50 D.L.R. 2d 38. 
32 Regina v. Barber, ex parte Warehousemen and Miscellaneous Drivera Union, 
[1968] 2 O.R. 245, 62 D.L.R. 2d 682. 
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arbitrators had answered a spécifie question of law, i.e. the correct inter-
prétation of a contract clause. But the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
argument, stating that the court's jurisdiction « is as full and complète 
where question of law are specifically referred as in a case where a question 
of law is only material to the issue to be arbitrated » 33. The majority 
declared that the Absalom rule existed in consensual arbitration, and « the 
reason for the distinction made by the rule . . . does not exist in arbitrations 
under the Labour Relations Act because in such cases the resort to arbit-
ration is compulsory » 34. 
Although élimination of the Absalom rule opened the door to more 
extensive judicial review of the arbitral process, Mr. Justice Jessup, 
writing for the Court in Barber, did not outline clearly the dimensions of 
the doorway the Court saw before it. At one point, he said that an award 
will not be overruled for an error in law « simply because the Court 
considers some other interprétation more apt if the interprétation of the 
language is one it will reasonably bear » 35, an apparent return to the 
earlier practice of the Court in upholding awards36. Elsewhere, he cited 
with approval a British common law rule that bars review of awards in 
which the arbitrator decided the « very question » that the parties presented, 
but calling for certiorari where the arbitrator has relied on inadmissible 
évidence or misconstrued a contract37. 
It appears that Justice Jessup may hâve proposed a newer version 
of the Absalom rule38, one according the courts broad authority to review 
awards, but giving them the power to nullify only those awards in which 
the arbitrators hâve not answered the « very question given them, or in 
which the contract will not « reasonably bear » the interprétation of an 
award. Clearly, the full impact of this décision will only become known as 
the courts apply thèse principles in future cases. In Barber, the Court 
quashed the award on the grounds that the contract would not reasonably 
bear the interprétation of the arbitration board. 
The Barber décision is linked to another change in Ontario labour 
arbitration, the replacement of county court judges as chairmen of arbitra-
tion boards. In 1967 Parliament acted to restrict the non-judicial activities 
of county court judges, who had traditionally served as neutral members 
of arbitration boards in Ontario39. This amendment, designed to encourage 
the professionalization of labour arbitration, has apparently exacerbated 
the clash between North American practice and British law described 
33 ibid., 68 DX.R. 2d at 687. 
34 ibid., at 685. 
35 ibid., at 687. 
36 This assumption is borne out by the High Court of Justice in Falconbridge 
Nickel Mines v. Weatherill, 69 C.L.L.C. para. 14,221. 
37 Kelanton Government v. Duff Development Co. [1923] A.C. 395, at 409, 
in ibid., at 688. 
38 Cf. National Union of Public Employées, Local 814 v. Ottawa Sanitation 
Services Limited, supra, note 28. 
39 Judges Act, Statutes of Canada, 1967, c. 176. 
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above. Non-judicial board chairmen (who generally write awards), though 
frequently lawyers, seem to décide cases with greater attention to the 
principles of industrial relations than do judges, who look more closely 
to the law and the wording of the agreement. Thus the views of the 
arbitration process held by the courts and arbitrators are likely to diverge 
more widely in the future. 
In light of the attitude of the courts, and the changes taking place 
within the arbitration profession, it is probable that new challenges to 
arbitration awards will be made in the courts. Moreover, after Barber, the 
courts hâve faced the necessity of formulating new policies towards 
arbitration. An examination of the existing body of case law suggests 
directions the courts may take. Thèse décisions, generally less than four 
years old, resulted from cases, mentioned above, involving material 
questions of law decided before Barber. However, the principles they 
contain could easily be applied within the limits of Barber. They are 
concentrated in four areas of labour arbitration where arbitrators and the 
courts hâve failed most frequently to agrée on the démarcation of their 
respective jurisdictions, and they iflustrate the difficulty of applying the law 
of commercial arbitration to labour cases. 
EVIDENCE OF INTENT 
Perhaps the most difficult question has been the admissibility of 
évidence. Though the OLRA frees arbitration boards from the common 
law rules of évidence 40, the courts hâve restricted admission to arbitration 
of évidence of the parties' intent underlying contract clauses. 
As the Absalom rule was applied in Canada, an arbitration board 
ruling on a spécifie question of law could go beyond a mère reading of 
the contract language only if the wording were ambiguous, while there 
were few restrictions on évidence in cases involving material questions of 
law. Though such a principle is almost inhérent in arbitration, labour 
arbitration often occurs when the negotiators of a contract are unable 
to agrée on a single interprétation of a provision, so arbitrators may look 
to évidence of intent, implicitly ruling that a contract is ambiguous. But 
the courts hâve readily ruled that agreements subject to arbitration were 
in fact unambiguous, quashing awards on the grounds that the arbitrators 
exceeded their jurisdiction by admitting « extrinsic > évidence, Le., évidence 
of the parties' intent beyond the written agreement. 
In one early case41, the parties engaged three arbitrators who had 
served as a conciliation board in récent contract bargaining. The arbitra-
tors based their décision on a reading of the agreement and a mémorandum 
exchanged by the parties prior to negotiations. Despite the obvious advant-
age of the arbitration board in determining the intent of the parties in 
bargaining, or the lack of genuine agreement on the meaning of a contract 
40 R.S.O., i960, c. 202, s. 34(7) . 
41 Civic Employées Union v. Municipality of Toronto, [1962] O.R. 970, 34 
D.L.R. 2d 711. 
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clause, the Court of Appeal quashed the award on the grounds the wording 
was so unambiguous that it precluded the use of any évidence beyond 
the wording of the contracta This décision was somewhat exceptional, 
however, as the courts were generally disposed to accept arbitrators' judge-
ment as to the need for using extrinsic évidence 43. 
This issue was faced squarely by the Court of Appeal in Barber, when 
it ruled that the agreement was so unambiguous that use of évidence of 
the parties' past practices was an error in law. In his décision, Justice 
Jessup emphasized that the intent of the parties should be « derived from 
their plain words rather than from extrinsic évidence » u . This aspect of 
Barber appears to hâve made the lower court increasingly reluctant to allow 
extrinsic évidence in arbitration. In a séries of cases decided in 1968-1969, 
the courts haved quashed awards based on the conduct of the parties 
prior to negotiating a contract45, conversations between management and 
labour46, management's past practice47, and the history of bargaining 
between the parties48, always because the contract wording was so un-
ambiguous that the arbitrators' use of such évidence exceeded their 
jurisdiction. In De Laval, the court disallowed the arbitrators' findkig of 
ambiguity based on a reading of two contract clauses together, noting that 
each clause, if taken separately, was unambiguous. 
Even this brief analysis reveals the courts' disposition to rely heavily 
on contract language, at the expense of other évidence, in the interprétation 
of agreements. The readiness of the judiciary to déclare contract language 
unambiguous is also striking, as practioners often admit that such agree-
ments are worded imprecisely 49. 
PROCÉDURAL VIOLATIONS 
A second area of dispute between the courts and arbitrators is that 
of procédural irregularities in the filing og grievances. The issue first 
42
 Similarly, in International Chemical Workers' Union v. Krever, 68 C.L.L.C. 
para. 14,086, the court refused to permit an arbitration board to base its décision 
on the Atomic Energy Control Act. 
4 3
 Cf. Re Canadian Westinghouse and United Electrical Workers, Local 504, 
supra, note 28 ; International Molders and Allied Workers Union v. Maxwell [1963] 
2 O.R. 280, 39 D.L.R. 2d 232 ; Regina v. Hanrahan, ex parte Davidson, 68 C.L.L.C. 
para. 14,119. 
44
 Regina v. Barber, supra, note 32, 2 O.R. 245 at 253. 
45 Regina v. Reville, ex parte United Steelworkers of America, [1968] 2 O.R. 92, 
68 D.L.R. 2d 213. 
46 Regina v. Weatherill, ex parte International Chemical Workers' Union, 68 
C.L.L.C. para. 14,132. 
47 Niagara Wire Weaving v. United Steelworkers, 69 C.L.L.C. para. 14,228. 
48 De Laval Co. v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, 69 C.L.L.C. para. 14,236. 
49 See the remarks of William E. SIMKIN in the discussion « The Rôle of the 
Law in Arbitration », in Arbitration and the Law, éd. by Jean T. McKelvey, Wash-
ington : BNA, 1959, p. 79. 
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arose in late 1965, when a union sought certiorari to quash an arbitrator's 
décision not to hear a grievance on its merits because of an « unreasonable 
delay » (five months) in initiating arbitration50. As no spécifie time limit 
appeared in the contract, the board presumably had broad authority to rule 
on the question of timeliness, but the Court of Appeal quashed the award 
on the grounds that the arbitrators had failed to exercise their jurisdiction 
by refusing to hear explanations for the delay. Although the Court did 
acknowledge that the grievant's delay could hâve been sufficient reason 
to refuse him access to arbitration, it denied that the board's décision 
constituted such a ruling. 
Initially, this décision indicated a willingness of the courts to support 
the évaluation of circumstances underlying technical violations of grievance 
procédures. This view received further support when the High Court of 
Justice denied certiorari against an arbitration award which rejected a claim 
of procédural irregularity the employer raised for the first time in the 
arbitration hearing51. The court accepted the principles behind the claim, 
but agreed that managements delay had vitiated the challenge. 
Early in 1968 both the Court of Appeal and the Suprême Court of 
Canada took stricter views of procédural violations. In Regina v. Weiler52, 
the Court of Appeal upheld an award which decided a grievance on its 
merits and disregarded a delay in the notice of arbitration. But the Suprême 
Court rêversed the décision on appeal53, on the grounds the arbitrators had 
exceeded their jurisdiction by not enforcing strict adhérence to the grievance 
procédure. 
While the Weiler case was pending before the Suprême Court, the 
Ontario judiciary adopted a less flexible position on procédural violations 54. 
In a décision ultimately upheld by the Suprême Court55, the Court of 
Appeal overruled an arbitration board that had decided to ignore a delay 
in the request for a hearing and had ruled on the merits of a grievance. 
The delay was caused by the union appointée to the board, who was uncer-
tain if the grievance would be taken to arbitration and waited five weeks 
beyond the contractual time limit before asking the Minister of Labour to 
nominate a neutral member. When constituted, the arbitration board 
expressed doubts about the force of the time limits in the agreement, as 
well as observing that neither the grievant nor his agent had caused the 
delay, before ruling on the original grievance. The courts quashed the 
award because of the delay, denying the arbitrators' assertion that the 
50 Ottawa Newspaper Guild, Local 205 and Bower v. The Ottawa Citizen, 
[1967] O.R. 669, (1966) 55 D.L.R. 2d 26. 
51 Regina v. Lane, ex parte Green, 66 C.L.L.C. para. 14,137. 
52 [1968] 1 O.R. 59, (1967) 65 D.L.R. 2d 417. 
53 Regina v. Weiler, ex parte Union Carbide Canada Ltd., 68 C.L.L.C. para. 
14,137. 
54 Regina v. General Truck Drivers' Union, ex parte Hoar Transport Ltd., 
[1968] 1 O.R. 705, 67 C.L.L.C. 2d 484. 
55 Regina v. General Truck Drivers* Union, ex parte Hoar Transport Ltd., 69 
C.L.L.C. para. 14,180. 
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flaw was a « technical irregularity », and describing the union's nominee 
on the board as the grievant's agent 
The décision in Hoar represented a significant shift in the courts' 
attitude from the Ottawa Newspaper Guild décision. In the latter case, they 
seemed to encourage or even order arbitrators to examine the circumstances 
surrounding procédural violations, while the Hoar ruling indicated that 
arbitrators wÛl hâve limited authority to go beyond a narrow interprétation 
on the clauses governing grievance procédures 56. 
DISCIPLINARY PENALTIES 
Contract clauses specifying discharge for « just cause >, almost 
universal features in North American collective agreements, hâve been 
a fréquent source of disagreement between the courts and arbitrators. In 
disciplinary cases, North American arbitrators often conclude that the 
penalty of discharge is too severe for the offense committed, though a 
grievant may hâve violated the agreement or rules established under it. 
In thèse circumstances, arbitrators frequently order a reduced penalty for 
the grievant57, but the Ontario courts hâve refused to sustain such awards 
in the absence of explicit contractual authorization. 
A séries of High Court décisions in the past décade, never challenged 
in the Court of Appeal, established this principle. In Regina v. Bigelow 58, 
the earliest case, an arbitration board heard the appeal of an employée 
discharged for absenteeism and failure to report for work in a fit condition. 
A majority found that the grievant had not been punished at ail for such 
offenses in several years, so the discharge, though justified, was unreason-
able, and the employée was reinstated without back pay, équivalent to a 
seven-month suspension. The court quashed the award on the grounds that 
the board had exceeded its jurisdiction by going beyond a ruling on the 
truth of management^ allégation of misconduct. Having found the employée 
guilty, the board had no power to alter his penalty. When the Court of 
Appeal dismissed an appeal of the ruling, the question of the arbitrators' 
authority in this area appeared settled in Ontario. 
This assumption was upset, at least in the minds of some arbitrators, 
by the Polymer 59 décision, one of the early arbitration cases heard by the 
56 MORIN, F. «Les arbitres nommés par les parties sont-ils liés par les délais 
de procédures établis à la Convention Collective », Relations Industrielles, Vol. 24, 
No. 3, août 1969, pp. 589-597. 
57 See A. Howard MEYERS, «Concepts of Industrial Discipline», in Manage-
ment Rights and the Arbitration Process, éd. by Jean T. McKelvey, Washington : 
BNA, 1956, pp. 65-67. 
58 Re International Nickel Co. of Canada and International Union of Mine, 
Mill and Smelter Workers, appeal dismissed by C.A., sub nom, Regina v. Bigelow, 
ex parte International Nickel Co. Ltd., [1959] O.R. 527, 19 D.L.R. 2d 380. 
59 Polymer Corp. Ltd. v. OU, Chemical and Atomic Workers* International 
Union, supra, note 16. The employer is a crown corporation and therefore governed 
by fédéral statute. 
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Suprême Court of Canada. An appeal sought to quash an award that 
ordered a union to compensate the employer for losses caused by a wildcat 
strike. Despite the absence of any mention of damages in the contract and 
the Ontario ban on suits against unions, the Suprême Court upfaeld the 
right of arbitrators to fashion such a remedy. Many arbitrators, after 
reading Polymer, believed they had received power to assess other penalties, 
including remédies in disciplinary cases. 
Arbitrators' expectations of greater authority were dispelled in 1966-
1968 by the Ontario judiciary, with support from the Suprême Court. 
Initially, the High Court of Justice, relying on Bigelow, refused to permit 
any changes in disciplinary penalties60, and then renied that such an 
award constituted the fashioning of a remedy analgous to damages in 
Polymer61. However, when the Court of Appeal again heard the issue, 
in Regina v. Arthur s 62, there was an apparent shift in opinion favouring 
greater autonomy for arbitrators, perhaps the resuit of the influence of 
Mr. Justice Bora Laskin, a former arbitrator, recently appointed to 
the Court. 
The grievants in Arthur s were three senior workers, one the local 
union président, whom the employer discharged for taking temporary 
jobs with another firm. Although their action violated the contract, the 
employées acted in anticipation of seasonal layoffs, which did not occur. 
When an arbitration board reduced the penalties to suspensions, manage-
ment sought certiorari to quash the award. 
Justice Laskin, speaking for a divided court, saw two éléments in 
the arbitrators* function. First they were obliged to détermine the truth 
of the employer's charges. If they found against the grievants, the board 
had to décide whether their conduct was « proper cause » for their dis-
charge under the terms of the agreement. The board in Arthur s supported 
the employer on the first question, but ruled that the grievants' action did 
not warrant discharge and ordered reinstatement. Laskin noted that in 
Bigelow the arbitrators ruled there was just cause for discharge, but still 
substituted suspension, whereas in Arthur s no grounds for discharge were 
found. 
Briefly stated, Laskin's décision would give arbitrators the power 
to interpret disciplinary clauses with considération to the equities involved 
and principles of industrial relations, a view of the arbitrator's rôle shared 
60 Regina v. Lane, supra, note 16. 
61 Regina v. Kennedy, ex parte Stanley Steel Co„ 68 C.L.L.C. para. 14,102. 
However, arbitrators were permitted to review a penalty when the employer in-
troduced évidence of an employee's past performance to justify a discharge. See 
Regina v. Roberts, ex parte Goodyear Tire and Rubber <?o., 67 C.L.L.C. para. 
14,025. 
62 [1967] 2 O.R. 49, 62 D.L.R. 2d 342. 
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by most American authorities 63, but less popular in Canada. A study of 
arbitration in Ontario made when most board chairmen were county court 
judges revealed that few arbitrators in the province would modify disciplin-
ary penalties unless the contract explicitly granted them the authority 64. 
It appears that some arbitrators in Ontario now favour a more libéral 
view of their power and thus came into conflict with the courts. After his 
opinion in Arthur s, Justice Laskin seemed to be in a position to persuade 
both the courts and arbitrators to give arbitration boards broader authority, 
at least in discharge cases. 
This notion was dispelled by the Suprême Court of Canada décision 
over-ruling Laskin in Arthur s 65. The Court held that the arbitration board 
had assumed managerial authority by ordering reinstatement and should 
hâve restricted its inquiry to the existence of proper cause for discharge. 
Since the facts clearly indicated a violation of the contract, the employer 
did hâve proper cause to dismiss the grievants. It was the Arthur s décision 
that prompted the appeal to the Labour Ministry mentioned earlier. 
It is apparent that the courts will not sustain future awards changing 
disciplinary penalties unless an arbitration board is specifically given the 
necessary authority to do so in an agreement66. 
DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE 
Findings that natural justice has been denied in arbitration occasion-
ally cause the courts to quash an award. Such cases, though rare, go to 
the heart of a labour-management relationship. Common law principles 
of natural justice refer to the rights of « parties » 67, without defining who 
is a « party » to a contract, as this issue seldom arises outside of labour-
management agreements. Individual employées, who obviously are affected 
by an agreement, are not signatories to it, and hence may be denied 
access to arbitration, for instance. This restriction may be defended on 
a strict légal basis, and also on the grounds that individual workers may 
not promote the affective administration of a contract by participating in 
arbitration on their own behalf. Neither argument seems to hâve received 
serious attention in the Ontario courts or the Suprême Court. 
63 For a discussion of this issue in the United States, Frank ELKOURI and Edna 
Asper ELKOURI, HOW Arbitration Works, Rev. éd., Washington : BNA, 1960, pp. 
419-433 ; or Paul PRASOW and Edward PETERS, Arbitration and Collective Bar-
gaining, Conflict Resolution in Labor Relations, New York : McGraw-Hill, 1970, 
pp. 204-207. 
64 Martin L. LEVINSON, Discharge and Discipline in Ontario, Toronto : Chromo 
Lithographing, 1959, pp. 23-26 ; CARROTHERS, Labour Arbitration in Canada, 
op. cit., pp. 84-86, 94-96. 
65 Regina v. Arthurs, et al., supra, note 16. 
66 The Court of Appeal upheld the modification of a penalty by an arbitration 
board when a contract contained spécifie authorization for such action in Regina 
v. McCulloch, ex parte Dowty Equipment, 69 C.L.L.C. para. 14,173. 
67 CARROTHERS, Labour Arbitration in Canada, op. cit., pp. 159-161. 
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The judiciary has emphasized the rights of individual workers to be 
included in arbitration proceedings, especially where effective représenta-
tion of their interests by a union is unlikely. A séries of décisions in 
1967-1968 spelled out the standards of natural justice necessary for 
arbitration proceedings. When two groups of unionized employées were 
competing for a single set of benefits under a collective agreement, the 
Ontario courts ruled that ail workers concerned must be notified of the 
hearing 68. The Suprême Court of Canada added criteria for the existence 
of natural justice in arbitration : that persons affected be informed of the 
nature of the case ; that thèse persons be allowed to présent their case to 
the arbitrators ; and that the board act in good faith ®. Later the Ontario 
courts quashed an award for déniai of natural justice because the chairman 
had gathered évidence in the absence of other board members 70. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In answer to the questions raised at the outset of this paper, the 
factors in Ontario labour law giving rise to judicial intervention are 
clear — the compulsory use of grievance arbitration, and the use of 
British commercial law by the courts in shaping their policy towards 
labour arbitration. In récent years, the courts hâve overcome their initial 
reluctance to intervene and seem to be moving in the direction of doser 
scrutiny of arbitration awards. Almost equally obvious is the courts' 
préférence for a legalistic philosophy of arbitration, with décisions based 
only on strict textual analyses of collective agreements, even where contract 
provisions may be vague. In fact, except for their treatment of natural 
justice, the courts appear to be encouraging a System that resembles British 
commercial arbitration for grievance seulement in Ontario. Though many 
employers, unions, and arbitrators favour legalism in collective bargaining, 
the protest by leading arbitrators to the Labour Minister indicates that 
this position is scarcely unanimous in Ontario. Moreover, few, if any, 
of the arbitrators who addressed the Minister were county court judges, 
so it is the protesters who should become more important to labour arbit-
ration as a resuit of changes in the Judges Act. 
Fundamental causes of judicial intervention may go beyond the légal 
philosophies of Ontario jurists. In enacting the OLRA the Provincial 
Législature drew heavily on U.S. expérience, as previously transplanted 
to Canada by PC 1003. In addition to adopting sorne éléments of the 
National Labor Relations Act, Ontario legislated in favour of American-
style grievance arbitration, an institution virtually unknown in labour-
68 Bradley v. Corporation of the City of Ottawa, et al., [1967] 2 O.R. 311, 63 
D.L.R. 2d 376. (This case was not governed by the OLRA, but the statute 
involved does not differ from the Labour Relations Act in its treatment of grievance 
arbitration). 
69 Hoogendoorn v. Greening Métal Products and Screening Equipment, [1968] 
S.C.R. 30, (1967) 65 D.L.R. 2d 641. 
70 Regina v. Fine, ex parte Sheraton Ltd., [1968] 2 O.R. 490, 69 D.L.R. 2d 625. 
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management relations outside of North America. However, U.S. grievance 
arbitration began and matured with relatively statutory assistance (though 
it spread considerably as a resuit of the War Labor Board in World War II), 
a différence that may hâve been overlooked by Ontario arbitrators, who, 
lacking a substantial body of Canadian literature on arbitration, in the 
past hâve concentrated on American practices. This reliance on American 
expérience probably accentuated arbitrators' différences with the courts. 
If any further évidence were needed, the judicial review of labour arbitra-
tion again illustrâtes the difficultés in transferring industrial relations 
practices from one nation to another. 
Assuming no change in the law of arbitration is imminent, employers 
and unions wishing to avoid the effects of Ontario court décisions may be 
forced to re-word collective agreements to state explicitly the limits of 
arbitrators' authority. This would facilitate the development of arbitration 
without intervention by the courts and less influenced by the United States, 
as well as encouraging the professionalization of arbitration. Obviously, 
such action entail risks for both parties, but acceptance of thèse hazards 
may contribute to the création of a new and more effective System for 
grievance seulement. 
LES APPELS DES DÉCISIONS ARBITRALES DEVANT 
LES TRIBUNAUX EN ONTARIO 
Au cours des dernières années, les conflits entre les arbitres du travail et les 
tribunaux se sont accentués en Ontario. Il en est résulté un nombre croissant 
d'arrêtés judiciaires cassant les sentences arbitrales. Bien que ce phénomène soit 
relativement récent, les fondements juridiques sont beaucoup plus anciens. Dans cet 
article, nous en analysons les facteurs et nous étudions les décisions récentes afin 
de mettre en lumière les tendances de la pensée juridique en Ontario. 
L'arbitrage des griefs a été institué en Ontario pendant la deuxième guerre 
mondiale, en particulier lorsque la législation fédérale extraordinaire était en 
vigueur. Après la guerre, la Loi sur les relations professionnelles (OLRA) a rendu 
le recours à l'arbitrage obligatoire pour régler les griefs restés sans solution. Ce fait 
a encouagé les tribunaux à contrôler les arbitrages de près, et a contribué, entre 
autres, à asseoir l'autorité des tribunaux de se prononcer sur les arbitrages. 
Bien que la OLRA déclare les sentences arbitrales être des jugements définitifs, 
la loi reconnaît des moyens de recours pour renverser les sentences arbitrales par 
les tribunaux. Généralement, un tel renversement s'appuie sur le manque de juri-
diction de l'arbitre. 
C'est en 1956 que les tribunaux d'Ontario ont, pour la première fois, affirmé 
leur pouvoir de réviser les sentences dans le cas de International Nickel Company 
and Rivando. La Cour d'appel a décidé qu'en raison de la nature obligatoire de 
l'arbitrage pour régler les griefs, elle n'avait d'autre solution que d'exercer une 
surveillance du processus. En déclarant être investie de pouvoir judiciaire, la Cour 
s'est basée sur des cas tirés de l'arbitrage commercial britannique. Cette institution 
est liée plus étroitement au droit que l'arbitrage des griefs ne l'est généralement en 
Amérique du Nord, et elle s'appuie sur l'interprétation littérale des termes du contrat. 
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Depuis le cas Rivando, les tribunaux se sont montrés réticents dans l'exercice 
de leur autorité. Dans quelques cas, des sentences ont été maintenues quand 
l'interprétation du contrat par l'arbitre a été jugée raisonnable. Par la suite, les 
cas ont été divisés en deux catégories : 1) les sentences arbitrales contenant des 
questions spécifiques de droit, par exemple l'interprétation de clause d'une conven-
tion, 2) celles concernant les questions matérielles de droit, par exemple lorsque 
l'arbitre décidait des questions de fait et de droit Selon les principes de droit 
commun exprimés dans un cas britannique, Absalom v. Great Western (London) 
Garden Village Society, seules les sentences arbitrales de la deuxième catégorie ont 
été considérées par les tribunaux. Au début, l'application de la décision d'Absalom 
a limité l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, mais la distinction n'a pu être appliquée à 
l'arbitrage canadien, processus bien différent de l'arbitrage commercial britannique 
dont celui-ci tire pourtant son origine. Du reste, la revendication même des droits 
des tribunaux dans le cas Rivando mit en question la convenance de considérer 
certains cas hors du domaine juridique. 
Les deux facteurs : le droit commercial britannique et l'arbitrage obligatoire, 
se sont trouvés réunis dans le cas Regina v. Barber, qui a mis fin à l'application 
de la décision d''Absalom. La Cour d'appel n'a pas fixé clairement les critères 
qu'elle désirait adopter pour juger les sentences d'arbitrage, mais elle semblait 
accorder un large pouvoir de se prononcer sur l'arbitrage uniquement dans les 
cas où les sentences ne répondent pas aux questions soumises aux arbitres ou celles 
où l'interprétation du contrat semble être trop libre. Le cas Barber apporta un autre 
changement dans l'arbitrage d'Ontario : la formation de tribunaux d'arbitrage. 
Auparavant, la majorité des arbitres neutres étaient des juges des tribunaux de 
comté, mais en 1967 le Parlement a restreint les activités extra-judiciaires de ces 
juristes. Ce phénomène devait encourager la professionnalisation de l'arbitrage mais 
également accentuer les conflits entre les arbitres et les tribunaux. 
En raison de la tendance des tribunaux à intervenir dans l'arbitrage des griefs, 
un examen des récentes décisions pourrait indiquer les lignes de la pensée juridique. 
Il y a quatre domaines dans lesquels les arbitres et les tribunaux n'ont pu parvenir 
à définir leur juridiction respective. 
Les questions concernant les preuves d'intention ont peut-être été les plus 
difficiles. Les tribunaux admettent de considérer les preuves extrinsèques telles que 
les usages et coutumes indigènes seulement lorsque les termes du contrat ne sont 
pas clairs. Le cas Barber a accentué la nécessité de s'appuyer sur les textes mêmes 
des conventions plutôt que sur les preuves extrinsèques. Il en est résulté une 
réticence des tribunaux à accepter les conclusions des arbitres lorsque celles-ci 
sont tirées des termes ambigus de la convention et ainsi ils ont cassé une série 
de sentences arbitrales reposant sur « des preuves extrinsèques ». 
Des infractions dans les formalités requises pour les clauses de grief et 
d'arbitrage ont été une deuxième source de difficultés. Avec l'accord de la Cour 
suprême du Canada, les tribunaux d'Ontario ont restreint les pouvoirs des arbitres 
dans les limites de la stricte interprétation littérale de ces clauses même si l'intérêt 
du plaignant a été compromis sans qu'il y ait faute de sa part. 
Des clauses de contrat prévoyant le congédiement seulement pour «cause 
justifiée » qui sont courantes dans les conventions collectives en Amérique du Nord, 
ont été fréquemment l'occasion de désaccords entre les tribunaux et les arbitres. 
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Les arbitres se trouvent souvent en accord avec l'employeur sur le fait que le 
travailleur a violé son contrat, mais ils ordonnent une réduction des sanctions prises 
surtout là où le renvoi d'un employé a été ordonné. Malgré le principe déclaré par 
la Cour suprême dans le cas de Polymer à savoir que les arbitres ont le pouvoir 
de régler ou d'ajuster les sanctions, ce tribunal a refusé aux arbitres d'Ontario le 
droit d'atténuer les sanctions disciplinaires si le contrat ne le prévoie pas spéci-
fiquement. 
Les tribunaux d'Ontario ont pris soin de protéger les droits des plaignants 
individuels en cas d'infractions au principe fondamental de justice naturelle. La 
Cour suprême du Canada a déclaré que tous les membres ayant un intérêt en 
cause, y compris ceux qui n'ont pas été signataires, devraient avoir la possibilité 
d'accéder à la procédure d'arbitrage. 
Cet examen du développement du droit montre que l'élément d'obligation qu'on 
trouve dans l'OLRA a conduit les tribunaux à intervenir en matière d'arbitrage ; 
en plus, leur utilisation du droit britannique leur a donné la possibilité d'intervenir 
plus largement dans le processus d'arbitrage. Ceci met en lumière la difficulté 
d'appliquer au Canada une institution étrangère qui est aussi complexe et subtile 
que celle de l'arbitrage. 
À cause des racines américaines du droit de l'Ontario, quelques arbitres 
auraient accordé une trop grande influence aux pratiques suivies aux États-Unis. 
Pour encourager le caractère professionnel de l'arbitrage au Canada, les signataires 
devraient préciser dans les conventions collectives les pouvoirs des arbitres. 
LE SYNDICALISME CANADIEN (1968) 
une réévaluation 
Introduction, Gérard Dion — Les objectifs syndicaux traditionnels et la société 
nouvelle (Jean-Réal Cardin — Gérard Picard — Louis Laberge — Jean Bru-
nelle). Les structures syndicales et objectifs syndicaux (Stuart Jamieson — 
Philippe Vaillancourt — Roland Martel). La démocratie syndicale (Gérard 
Dion — Adrien Plourde). Les rivalités syndicales : force ou faiblesse (Evelyne 
Dumas — Gérard Rancourt — Raymond Parent). Le syndicalisme et les tra-
vailleurs non-syndiqués (Léo Roback — Jean-Gérin-Lajoie — F.-X. Légaré). 
L'extension de la formule syndicale à des secteurs non-traditionnels (Shirley B. 
Goldenberg — André Thibaudeau — Raymond-G. Laliberté — Jean-Paul 
Brassard). Le syndicalisme et la participation aux décisions économiques 
(Bernard Solasse — Jacques Archambault — Fernand Daoust — Charles 
Perreault). Les syndicats et l'action politique (Vincent Lemieux — Marcel 
Pépin — Laurent Châteauneuf et William Dodge). Le syndicalisme, la société 
nouvelle et la pauvreté (Hon. Maurice Lamontagne). Bilan et horizons. 
Annexes : Le syndicalisme au Canada ; la Concurrence syndicale dans le 
Québec (Gérard Dion). 
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